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Many mainstream accounts of the recent Taksim-Gezi park protests have 
made references to the so-called Arab Spring events in Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) countries.  Many asked the same question: Are the 
Taksim Protests Turkey’s Arab Spring?  
The protest in Taksim started small: its initial aim was to stop developers from 
building a shopping-centre that was to be housed in a replica of a military 
barracks building demolished sixty years ago. For the protestors the 
development meant the destruction of much of the Gezi Park, one of the last 
green spots in central Istanbul.  However, the character of the protests 
changed when the Turkish police attacked protesters with considerable 
violence, and what started as an environmental protest in Istanbul quickly 
turned into a nation-wide political demonstration against the policies of Prime 
Minister Tayyip Erdogan and his government.  The protests rapidly gained 
support from a cross-section of society in Istanbul and other urban centres 
and became diversified.  However, the protests were led and dominated by 
young middle class professionals and their demands for access, freedom and a 
new kind of urban living.  Despite the expanding scope of demands and 
expectations, issues related to the city and its quality of life remained at the 
heart of the protests.  
It is no coincidence that the demonstrations began and were concentrated in 
Istanbul, the largest and the most developed urban centre in Turkey.  Istanbul 
has been the centre of large-scale urban transformation and regeneration over 
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the past three decades.  It was in the 1980s, soon after the military coup in 
Turkey, that the city witnessed the beginning of the neoliberal transformation 
and the celebration of property rights, in a similar fashion to other 
metropolitan centres, like New York, London, Madrid, etc. In this sense, the 
Taksim-Gezi protests share a common ground with a great many diverse 
social movements focusing on the urban question, from India and Brazil to 
China, Spain, Argentina and the US.  This analysis is in line with David 
Harvey's reworking of Marxist political theory which places the city first and 
foremost, in terms of its position as a generator of capital accumulation, as 
opposed to the factory/work place. Harvey, distinguished Professor of 
Anthropology and Geography, discusses how urbanization plays a key role in 
social conflicts of today.   This is justified by an economic argument around 
the importance to capitalism of land, rent and speculation more so than 
straightforward production.  “Over the past 30-40 years, where cities try to 
brand themselves and sell a piece of their history. What is the image of a city? 
Is it attractive to tourists? Is it trendy? So a city will market itself.” (Interview 
with David Harvey: Rebel Cities & Urban Resistance Part II, 7 January 2013)  
Just a week before the Taksim-Gezi protests started, David Harvey was 
speaking about the urban origins of the social movements and referring to 
Istanbul, saying that “What do we see in Istanbul? Cranes, everywhere. “ 
(SPIEGEL ONLINE, 21 May 2013)   
 
Democracy and “representation” 
Some of those hasty proclamations of a “Turkish Spring” concentrate on 
Tayyip Erdogan’s increasingly anti-democratic and authoritarian ruling style, 
and compare Erdogan’s rule with Mubarak’s. A certain slogan evoked some 
sympathy in the crowd: “Taksim will become Tahrir!”   To them, the Taksim 
protests represent the next stage of the “Arab Spring”.   
Turkey’s Tayyip Erdogan has been, by far, the most popular politician in 
Turkey after winning three consecutive elections by increasing his majority: 
34 per cent in 2002, 47 per cent in 2007 and more than 50 per cent in 2011. 
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His success and popularity is interlinked with Turkey’s economic development 
in the same decade: Erdogan’s leadership coincided with an impressive 
growth spurt for Turkey which placed the country among the top ten emerging 
stars of the world alongside with the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa.  Turkey’s per capita income was tripled within a decade under 
Erdogan’s leadership.  The annual economic output of the Turkish economy is 
at $10,000 per person, about the same level as Brazil or Mexico and has been 
growing at a steady pace.  
Alongside managing a growing economy, Erdogan’s government has achieved 
some other significant successes during its 11 years in office.  The AKP regime 
has actively taken on the coup leaders of Turkey’s recent troubled past.  A 
large number of generals were arrested, and one in three generals is now in 
prison.  It was also under Erdogan’s leadership that significant steps were 
taken to calm the decades-long violent conflict with the country’s significant 
Kurdish minority.  However, these successes have fuelled Erdogan’s sense of 
his own importance in Turkey’s recent economic rise.  His use of the state 
apparatus to establish his power base to such excess has led to accusations 
that he is indeed governing the country in the same autocratic style for which 
he had bitterly criticised the secular generals. After 11 years and three terms in 
power the result is the emergence of an increasingly authoritarian, religiously 
inspired and obsessively neoliberal system, which is based on a cleverly 
crafted hegemonic apparatus. This has been quite evident since 2011, with the 
start of violent repression of public protests, the jailing of journalists on 
suspicion of conspiring with terrorists, pressure being put upon newspaper 
owners to sack critical journalists; and the updating of the 1980s’ military 
regime’s anti-terrorism laws. (OpenDemocracy, 11 February 2012) 
All the above mentioned reactions and policies are characteristic of an 
administration that has spent too long in power and become far too confident 
and perhaps complacent about its capacity to maintain electoral power. But  
none of these justify the placement of the recent events in Turkey in the same 
category  as the so-called Arab Spring countries.  Despite the obvious “Tahrir 
feel” of Taksim, one must acknowledge that the differences are substantial. To 
start with, Mubarak was a dictator, Recep Tayyip Erdogan is an elected prime 
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minister.  More importantly, the Arab uprisings were mass events preceded by 
massive economic crises, while the protest movement in Turkey has been  
mainly led by middle and upper-middle-class youth and young urban 
professionals -the beneficieries of much of the economic growth –defending  
their urban space and lifestyle.  
 
The mainstream terminology employed in  media and expert commentaries, 
and shared by many liberal/secular accounts make the comparisons between 
Taksim and Tahrir Square referring to the ability of the street to topple a 
government.  Some have even claimed that “the Gezi Park resistance is a 
[revolutionary] turning point for the people of Turkey.  After many decades 
they feel their power again”.  However tempting, we believe such comparisons 
represent a gross over-simplification based on a range of superficial 
similarities many of which ignore the class analysis of the events.  The 
political-economy background of the events in Turkey is very different from 
that of its war-torn Arab neighbours. Turkey’s protests also need to be 
distinguished from the expression of discontent in some of its European 
neighbours, such as Greece and Spain where weak economies have brought 
the unemployed youth out onto the streets.   
  
Brazil and Turkey -- Protests Follow Economic Success 
It would be more appropriate to make comparisons between the 
demonstrations in Turkey and the protests in Brazil, which started just a 
couple of weeks after the protests in Taksim.  Despite their significant 
differences, in particular in terms of the reactions from the Turkish and 
Brazilian authorities, both Turkish and Brazilian protesters seemed to be 
coming from similar class backgrounds and ages. And they were making 
similar demands of urban democracy in similarly innovative ways.   
There are a number of other comparisons that might be made of Turkey and 
Brazil: both are emerging powers with booming economies and dynamic, 
democratically elected governments; both countries are exerting considerable 
influence in the regions around them, and often being cited as models; both 
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have been developing global ambitions.  Brazil is one of the BRICS, B of the 
BRICS, and the largest economy in the Western hemisphere after the US.  
Turkey is at a critical junction of Europe and the Middle East, and is a key 
geopolitical player in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East.  Both 
countries pull considerable weight in affairs far beyond their own borders.  
There are, of course, some divergences too. The immediate, explicit issues 
which led to the protests are not exactly the same, but similarly urban: the 
government’s plan to redevelop Gezi Park, an urban park next to Istanbul's 
Taksim Square in the Turkish case,  very much "a right to the city" type of a 
movement; an increase in public transport fares in Sao Paulo in Brazilian 
case- for free bus fares tens of thousands of young Brazilians took to the 
streets to reclaim their city from neoliberal forces.  The governments are not 
at all alike, Turkey having a long-serving popular leader who heads a 
conservative Islamist party; and Brazil with a relatively new president, a 
former leftist guerrilla who was imprisoned and tortured in the 1970s during 
military dictatorship, heading a leftist popular movement.  But there is a very 
important similarity: they are both representative democracies. Not only that, 
each country has a powerful military that had been involved in politics in the 
not too distant past.  But now, both countries have managed to put their 
armies in the barracks, and therefore their democracies considered quite 
stable.  Based on their economic progress, development and reasonably stable 
democracies, both countries are often cited as examples of previously 
underdeveloped countries able to overcome their troubled political past.   In 
this sense, there is no Turkey Spring as there is no Brazilian Spring.  This is 
not Tunisia, Egypt or Libya.  Democratically elected governments in Turkey 
and in Brazil are far more resilient and their leaders far more popular and 
secure in their power than the North African dictators swept away by the 
events of 2011.  Despite his increasingly authoritarian policies, Turkey’s 
Erdogan still remains immensely popular among the country’s poor and 
deeply religious majority, even in Kurdish majority areas.   
However, as can be seen in many “democratic” countries, democratically 
elected leaders often come to have an inflated sense of knowing better than 
their citizens what is best for their citizens, and they have a tendency to favour 
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prestigious infrastructure projects over the impact these might have on 
peoples’ daily lives.  This is exactly what is at stake both in Turkey and Brazil.  
So, in one sense, both in Brazil and Turkey, participatory democracy was 
forcefully diluted among an orgy of neoliberal mega-projects, generating 
dubious profits for a small elite in their respective countries.  This also   
created an inflated sense of self-image around these mega structures for the 
respective leaders.  In the Turkish case, it is the ruling AKP’s collusion with 
powerful business interests in the so–called re-development of Istanbul.  In 
the Brazilian case, it revolves around massive public funds spent for the 
hosting of the World Cup and the Olympics.   
Both Turkey and Brazil have seen a strong period of mass growth, 
economically and population-wise.  Sustained growth brought in enough tax 
revenues to improve both education and health spending.  The boom also 
allowed the governments to increase minimum wages significantly without 
any apparent damage to employment.  As a result of the governments’ 
extension of welfare, health and educational provision, a large section of 
people in Turkey, and Brazil, has gained access to better public services. 
 If we try to make a connection between these economic success stories and 
the recent protest movements, the first observation would be about how a 
strong cycle of economic enrichment over the past decade has changed the 
public’s expectations of its politicians.  Since the Turkish and Brazilian 
regimes achieved sustained growth and employment, delivering on growth 
and employment is no longer enough to satisfy the majority of their 
populations.  Citizens increasingly hold their leaders accountable to improve 
the quality of public services, and to expand the boundaries of participatory 
democracy, and listen to their concerns closely.  One therefore can consider 
the protests in Turkey and Brazil as a symptom of radically shifting demands, 
driven mostly by these emerging power houses’ economic success.  These are 
democratic protest movements in societies experiencing rapid change where 
the public’s demand for better services and more democracy at local as well as 
national levels grow at a faster pace than their governments’ ability to provide.  
Despite the multiplication of the slogans and emerging chaos about the aims 
of the protesters, it is important to note that the protest of both Turkey’s and 
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Brazil’s urban youth are first and foremost a response to the ruling regimes’ 
grandiose neoliberal projects of urban transformation and its associated 
gentrifying schemes, with the aim of creating high-tech malls, skyscrapers, 
and expensive giant high-tec stadiums.    
 
Youth and urban “warfare”   
Much like the protesters in Turkey, most demonstrators in Brazil have jobs 
and are well educated.  They are mainly from the country's growing middle 
classes, which government figures show has ballooned by some 40 million 
over the past decade amid a commodities-driven economic boom.  Unlike 
countries such as Greece and Spain where weak economies have brought the 
unemployed out onto the streets, the discontent in Brazil and Turkey has been 
created by strong economic growth. As standards of living have risen, so have 
people’s expectations for better services and wider participation in decision-
making.  Brazilian and Turkish youth are not protesting because they want to 
overthrow a dictator or are angry about massive unemployment. They are 
upset, and rightly so, about the priorities and the manner in which these have 
been pursued – without sufficient consultation - by their governments.  They 
demand the right to participate in the planning and distribution of their 
country’s wealth. In both countries, more and more people demand the right 
to be heard and to be involved, linked to the feeling that they aren't really able 
to get involved.  They want the right to determine their own futures.  They are 
no longer prepared to be talked down to by the government.  The protests can 
in one sense be read as the articulation by those involved of what a fair and 
just world might be. Turkish and Brazilian youth, rejecting the neoliberal 
notion that democracy and markets are the same, have not only addressed 
some of the current injustices while reclaiming their urban space, but they 
also started to produce new ideas with a new and very imaginative political 
language.  
The whole process is almost a textbook case of what David Harvey describes 
as “the urbanization of capital”: 
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The reproduction of capital passes through processes of 
urbanization in myriad ways.  But the urbanization of capital 
presupposes the capacity of capitalist class powers to dominate 
the urban process.  This implies capitalist class domination not 
only over state apparatuses,… but also over whole populations – 
their lifestyles as well as their labor power, their cultural and 
political values as well as their mental conceptions of the world. 
That level of control does not come easily, if at all.  The city and 
the urban process that produces it are therefore major sites of 
political, social, and class struggles.(Rebel Cities, Verso, p.65)   
 
In the final analysis, we believe that the protest movements in the urban areas 
of Turkey and Brazil represent the direct responses of youth in the search of “a 
different way of urban living from that which was being imposed upon them 
by capitalist developers and the state” (Rebel Cities, p.21).  In our view, the 
demonstrations can be connected to a wider discussion developed by David 
Harvey around “the right to the city” which is a right to democratic control 
over the process of urbanization.  The specific aims of the protesters in 
Istanbul and Sao Paolo, to keep a green space as a public park and to defend 
affordable transportation fees for urban public, are in a general sense their 
attempt to reclaim their city, their urban space.    Whatever the initial results, 
or lack of specific gains, of the recent protests, Turkish and Brazilian youth 
have already initiated “a platform for what an alternative urbanization project 
might look like”.(The White Review) 
 
 
 
 
* “Rebel Cities” is a reference to David Harvey’s 2012 book, Rebel Cities: From 
the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (Verso, 2012). 
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